This paper examines the impacts of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on the environmental and economic performance of Norwegian plants. The EU ETS is regarded as the cornerstone climate policy both in the EU and in Norway, but there has been considerable debate regarding its eects due to low quota prices and substantial allocation of free allowances to the manufacturing industry. Both quota prices and allocation rules have changed signicantly between the three phases of the ETS. The rich data allow us to investigate potential eects of the ETS on several important aspects of plant behavior. The results indicate a weak tendency of emissions reductions among Norwegian plants in the second phase of the ETS, but not in the other phases. We nd no signicant eects on emissions intensity in any of the phases, but positive eects on value added and productivity in the second phase. Positive eects on value added and productivity may be due to the large amounts of free allowances, and that plants may have passed on the additional marginal costs to consumers.
Introduction
Since the establishment of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in 2005, emissions trading has been the cornerstone policy instrument to reduce greenhouse gas (GH G) emissions in Europe. The aim of this paper is to investigate how the ETS regulation has aected the environmental and economic performance of Norwegian plants, particularly in the manufacturing industries. The rst phase of the EU ETS lasted from 2005 to 2007, the second from 2008 to 2012, while the third lasts from 2013 to 2020. We are mainly interested in whether plants regulated by the ETS have reduced their emissions as a result of the regulation. Emissions reductions can take place by scaling down production or by reducing emissions per output (or both). Thus, we also examine the eects of the ETS on emissions per output, which we refer to as emissions intensity. A positive price on emissions allowances (or quotas) should provide incentives to cut back on emissions. However, the price of allowances has periodically been rather low, moderating these incentives. Moreover, abatement often takes place through investments in new equipments and machinery, which may be driven by expected future emissions prices rather than current prices. Manufacturing plants have received most of the allowances they have used for free, and it is questionable how this have aected plants' incentives to reduce emissions.
We are also interested in estimating the eects of the ETS on economic performance through measures such as value added and productivity. On the one hand, environmental regulation puts constraints on plants (directly or indirectly), suggesting that plants on average are worse o after the regulation. On the other hand, the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) suggests that environmental regulation can increase plants' productivity and competitiveness as it provides incentives to innovate. When it comes to emissions trading, the extent of free allocation obviously also matters: If plants receive most of their allowances for free, and are able to pass on most of the marginal cost increase to consumers, they may be better o than without the ETS. The European European Commission (2015) nds that a signicant share of the emissions price is passed on to consumers for a number of products regulated by the EU ETS.
There are relatively few econometric studies of the EU ETS, and no such previous studies using Norwegian data (as far as we know). Martin et al. (2015) sum up the empirical evidence for the EU ETS so far, both with respect to emissions and rms' performance, distinguishing between studies using aggregate data and studies using micro-data. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) use aggregate data to empirically examine the eects of the two rst years of the EU ETS . They nd that some emissions reduction took place, tentatively 2.5-5 percent. Similar conclusions are obtained by Egenhofer et al. (2011) for the years 2008-09. Anderson and Di Maria (2011) (phase I) and Bel and Joseph (2015) (phase I and II) use panel data based on countries' total emissions to estimate the extent of abatement, and nd quite similar results as Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Egenhofer et al. (2011) . Despite the emissions reduction, Ellerman and Buchner (2008) also conclude that a signicant overallocation occurred for some sectors and countries in the rst phase, i.e., many plants received more allowances than their business-as-usual emissions.
1
We are aware of only three studies on the eects of the EU ETS using rm or plant level data. Wagner et al. (2014) use plant-level data for France to estimate the eects of the two rst phases of the EU ETS. They nd evidence of signicant emissions reductions in phase II, as well as indications of emissions reductions in phase I. On average emissions were reduced by 15-20 percent. A large share of the emissions reductions were due to increased use of natural gas instead of coal and oil. Similarly, Petrick and Wagner (2014) use plant-level data for German manufacturing rms for the years 2005-10, and nd evidence of emissions reductions in the second phase: Emissions were reduced by on average one fth according to their estimates. Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) also consider the years 2005-10, using plant-1 Jarait e-Kaºukausk e and Kaºukauskas (2015) show that rms with few installations and less trading experience were less likely to participate in the ETS market in the rst phase of the EU ETS, and traded lower quantities of allowances. They point to transaction costs as an explanation for this nding, together with an inclination among smaller rms to use allowances for compliance only. Hence, emissions reductions could be limited despite a positive price on emissions.
level data for Lithuania, nding no reductions in emissions, but a slight improvement in emissions intensity in 2006-7 (their data did not allow them to study eects on emissions intensity beyond 2007). There also exist studies on other emissions trading systems using micro-data, such as Fowlie et al. (2012) who investigate eects of the Southern California's N O x Trading Program (RECLAIM). The four above mentioned studies exploit that only a subset of plants or rms were selected for program participation and identify the closest match among the plants or rms not selected for participation.
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When it comes to economic performance, Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) nd no signicant impacts of the EU ETS on Lithuanian rms' protability. Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) use micro-data to estimate the eects of the EU ETS on revenues of German rms in 2005, nding no signicant eect. Commins et al. (2011) also use micro-data for European companies to study the eects of the rst phase of the EU ETS on rms' performance, nding negative impacts on both value added and productivity. On the other hand, Bushnell et al. (2013) nd that stock prices for carbon-intensive manufacturing industries in Europe fell when the 
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We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, as already indicated there are few econometric studies of the EU ETS using micro-data. Decisions regarding emissions reductions take place at the plant level, and quotas have been allocated to individual plants based on their historic activity (emissions or output) or planned capacity. Thus, studying the impacts of the EU ETS should ideally be carried out at the plant level, which we do using Norwegian data. Second, our specication allows us to compare the eects of the dierent phases. This is important as allocation rules and quota prices have diered much 2 use micro-data to analyze the impacts of the UK carbon tax, nding strong negative eects on energy intensity and use of electricity at manufacturing plants.
3 Linn (2010) uses stock prices to estimate the eects on prots of rms regulated by the N Ox cap-and-trade program in the eastern US, nding substantial reductions in prot despite free allocation of allowances. There is also a related strand of literature estimating the price drivers in the EU ETS (e.g., Hintermann 2010; Creti et al. 2012 ).
between phases. Third, our rich data set allows us to control for plant heterogeneity through a number of control variables. For instance, we indirectly control for carbon taxes on fossil fuels combustion, using plant specic data on relative energy prices (dirty vs clean).
Our paper also relates to the large theoretical literature on emissions trading, including the literature on impacts of quota allocation. The seminal paper by Montgomery (1972) shows that both auctioning and lump sum allocation of allowances lead to the same costeective outcome (assuming a perfectly competitive allowance market). However, allocation of allowances in the EU ETS has to some degree been conditioned on plants' activity level, and hence may have inuenced plants' decisions.
4 The eects of dierent allocation rules have been studied analytically and numerically by e.g. Lange (2005), Rosendahl (2008) and Golombek et al. (2013) . In the third phase beginning in 2013, allocation has shifted towards benchmarking, or output-based allocation. As shown by Rosendahl and Storrøsten (2015) , this gives rms more incentives to reduce emissions intensities than auctioning (or lump sum allocation). On the other hand, it is also possible that foresighted rms correctly anticipated that allocation of allowances would be based on their historic emissions a few years before the ETS was implemented, giving them incentives to increase emissions in some years before 2005.
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In order to identify the causal eects of the ETS, we exploit that only a subset of the plants were selected for participation. Other plants, at least in the manufacturing industries which we focus on, were mainly left unregulated with respect to GHG emissions, or have been paying a carbon tax (see Section 3.2). Similar to Wagner et al. (2014) , Petrick and Wagner (2014) , Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) and Fowlie et al. (2012) , we use matching methods based on the program participation selection criteria in order to identify a comparable control 4 For instance, new plants have received allowances for free, whereas plants closing down are no longer entitled to free allowances in the future. This is to some degree intentional, as policy makers in Europe do not want rms to simply relocate to other jurisdictions with lax climate policies. See the substantial literature on carbon leakage, e.g., , Böhringer et al. (2014) , Böhringer et al. (2012) , Fischer and Fox (2012) .
5 In the rst two phases, allowances to Norwegian plants were grandfathered based on their emissions in 1998-2001.
For EU countries, the base years diered somewhat. For several EU countries, the base years for allocation in the second phase included 2005, i.e., the rst year of the rst phase (Hintermann, 2010) .
group of plants that were not selected for program participation. Then we use dierence-indierences, and as an alternative, a xed eects model, to investigate the eects of the ETS while controlling for a number of other important variables.
Our results indicate weak evidence of emissions reductions among Norwegian plants in the second phase of the ETS, but no signicant eects of the two other phases. Moreover, we nd no signicant eects on emissions intensity of any of the three phases. Further, we identify positive eects of the second phase on both value added and productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some background information on the ETS. Section 3 contains a description of the data and of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The econometric model and the results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy implications.
The Norwegian and the EU Emissions Trading System
The EU ETS regulates greenhouse gas emissions from energy production and some large manufacturing industries (see Ellerman et al. (2015) for a recent overview). Initially only CO 2 was included, but later other GHGs in selected industries have been added. The number of regulated industries has also increased somewhat over time.
The rst phase of the EU ETS (2005-07) is referred to as a pilot phase, covering around 40 percent of CO 2 emissions in the EU (cf. EU's quota directive 2003/87/EF). The allocation of allowances was determined by the member states, but had to be accepted by the EU Commission. Almost all allowances were allocated for free, mostly based on plants' historic emissions (grandfathering). Whereas the price of allowances reached high levels in the rst half of this period (up to 30 Euro per ton), the price plummeted towards zero in 2007 as it was clear that total allocation of allowances exceeded total emissions during this three-year period.
In the rst phase, Norway had an ETS that was not formally linked to the EU ETS. Norway was allowed to auction a larger share of its allowances in the second phase, but the EU harmonization in phase III also applies to Norway. Hence, whereas the Norwegian oil and gas industry did not receive any allowances for free in phase II, they received a substantial number in phase III (as did manufacturing industries). Figure 1 illustrates the development over time in total emissions of CO 2 , N 2 O and P F Cs 3.1 Emissions, emissions intensity, value added, and productivity
We study the eects of the EU ETS on several dependent variables: Emissions, emissions intensity, labor productivity, and value added. Our main measure of a plant's annual emissions includes CO 2 , N 2 O and P F Cs emissions, all measured in tons of CO 2 equivalents. We also consider an alternative measure of emissions that only include CO 2 .
Ideally, emissions intensity should be calculated as emissions relative to output produced (e.g., emissions per ton of steel or per ton of cement). However, as the type of output diers across plants and industries, it is challenging to compare output quantities across plants.
Moreover, we do not have data for the quantities produced, only the value of production.
Emissions intensities calculated as emissions relative to production value would be sensitive to changes in the output price. A common measure of emissions intensity is therefore emissions relative to the number of employees (see e.g. Wagner et al., 2014) . However, such a measure does not take into account that some employees have part-time positions, are on sick leave, work extra hours, etc. Hence, it may be better to use man hours instead of number of employees. In our main estimations we calculate emissions intensities as emissions relative to man hours. This is not an ideal measure, as a plant could increase or decrease its labor intensity during our estimation period. Thus, in Section 4.3 we also consider an alternative measure of emissions intensities, calculated as emissions relative to electricity use (measured in kWh per year). However, as the ETS should give incentives to switch between dierent energy goods, such as replacing coal or oil with electricity, our preferred specication is emissions relative to man hours.
Value added at factor prices is the plant's annual gross production value minus the cost of intermediates plus subsidies and minus taxes (except VAT). Production value is dened as turnover corrected for changes in stock of nished goods, work in progress and goods and services bought for resale. Cost of intermediates is the value of goods and services used as input in the production process, excluding xed assets. Our measure of value added is an ocial measure taken from Statistics Norway.
8 The value added in NOK is deated using the Producer Price Index (PPI) with 2013 as the base year.
Productivity should be measured as output produced relative to the use of input. Again, good measures of output is challenging to obtain as plants produce dierent types of goods, and we only have data on production value, not quantities produced. Despite this shortcoming, we use the value added at factor prices as a proxy for output. This measure has the advantage that it is comparable across plants. Further, we use man hours as a proxy for input, so that plant productivity is equal to labor productivity, i.e., value added at factor prices per man hour.
Control variables
Contrary to studies at the industry level, we are able to take into account plant heterogeneity in our analysis, and thereby reduce the problem of omitted variable bias. This relates both to plant characteristics, and to external factors for the plant such as pre-tax prices and carbon taxes.
Until the ETS was implemented, the cornerstone of Norwegian climate policy was a non-uniform carbon tax implemented in 1991, with exemptions for many energy-intensive manufacturing industries. As mentioned earlier, emissions regulated by the carbon tax were exempted from the ETS in the rst phase but not in the second phase (e.g., pulp and paper production and oil and gas production). Only the oil and gas industry had to pay carbon 8 A more detailed description of the measures are available at the homepage of Statistics Norway.
taxes in addition to being regulated by the ETS from 2008.
9 As the carbon tax has only been implemented on the use of fossil fuels, we indirectly control for this tax through plant-specic relative energy prices: First, prices of petroleum, coal, gas and electricity are calculated as the plant's expenses on the respective energy good (in NOK) relative to the corresponding energy content (in kWh). Then the relative energy price at the plant level is calculated as the price of dirty energy (weighted petroleum, coal and gas prices) relative to the price of clean energy (electricity). Electricity is characterized as clean since there is no emissions from electricity use and also since renewable power (mainly hydro power) accounts for more than 95 percent of Norwegian electricity production in the estimation period. Changes in relative input prices can provide incentives for input factor substitution towards relatively inexpensive input factors (Hicks, 1932) . When it comes to plant characteristics, we use the number of employees as a measure of plant size. Common trends in emissions are controlled for using time dummies (one for each phase). All determinants of emissions intensity at the industry level are controlled 9 Domestic aviation, which was included in the ETS from 2012, also pays a carbon tax. 10 As changes in the carbon tax show up in changes in the relative energy price, this means e.g. that the estimated eects of the ETS for plants that were initially regulated by the tax, at least in principle apply to the eects of the ETS as such, and not to the net eects of replacing the carbon tax with the ETS. for through the use of industry dummies (the aggregated industries are listed in Table 3 2 All emissions are reported as tons of CO 2 -equivalents 3 All values in million NOK are deated using the PPI with 2013 as base year.
Extraction. The plant level data from Statistics Norway do not cover these industries, and thus these plants are dropped. The control group is selected from the total population of plants emitting CO 2 , N 2 O or P F Cs using nearest neighbor propensity score matching (see Section 4). Our nal unbalanced panel data set consists of 1,567 plant-year observations and 152 plants in the manufacturing industries, 72 of which are regulated by the ETS. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and demonstrates how ETS and non-ETS plants dier with respect to the dierent variables before the matching procedure. Table 2 illustrates the same descriptive statistics for the matched sample, i.e. the treatment and the control group. The matching procedure reduces the dierences between the treatment group and the non-treated (the control group) substantially with respect to almost all variables (the exceptions are labor productivity and relative energy prices, where the dierences are quite small in any case). For instance, before matching the emissions intensity of the control group was only 1.1 percent of the emissions intensity of the treatment group. After the matching procedure the emissions intensity of the control group constitutes 11 percent of the emissions intensity of the treatment group. Note that the dierences between the treatment and control plants also include any eects from the ETS regulation. As seen from Table 3 , there are no plants from the industries Mining and extraction (excluding oil and gas) and Oil and gas extraction in our nal data set, which comprises only the manufacturing industries. The reason for this is that the matching procedure does not nd any neighbors outside the manufacturing industries as nearly all Oil and gas extraction plants are regulated by the ETS, and very few Mining and extraction (excluding oil and gas) plants are regulated by the ETS. reservoir. See Gavenas et al. (2015) for a study of CO 2 emissions from Norwegian oil and gas elds. 4 Empirical model and results
Our main ob jective is to investigate the eects of the ETS on Norwegian plants' environmental performance (emissions and emissions intensity) and economic performance (value added and productivity). Similar to Fowlie et al. (2012) , Petrick and Wagner (2014) , Wagner et al. (2014) and Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) , we exploit the fact that only a subset of the plants were selected for participation in the ETS. The selection for ETS participation of a plant is based on the type of pollutant, the plant activity (production of specic types of goods) and the capacity limit.
12 We do not observe all these factors for plants that 12 The capacity limit is specied as e.g. total thermal eect (typically 20 MW), or tons of products (steel, cement etc.) per hour or 24 hours. As the regulator selects plants for participation in the ETS based on the capacity limit, regression discontinuity constitutes as a suitable method for estimating the eects of the ETS (see e.g. Lee and Lemieux (2010) ). However, the capacity limit varies with the main activity of the plant, and we do not have comparable data on the activity of the plants in the control group. Also, there is a lot of missing values for the measures of capacity.
With an already small sample of Norwegian plants, it would thus not be manageable to use regression discontinuity methods based on the capacity limit.
are not regulated by the ETS. For each plant regulated by the ETS we identify the closest matches among the plants not selected for participation in the ETS based on the propensity score.
13 The propensity score is the probability of receiving treatment conditional on some matching variables. The variables used are proxy measures of the participation requirements of the ETS.
14 In this way we identify a comparable control group of plants that were not selected for program participation. 17 Finally, as continuous matching variables we include predetermined levels of emissions (as a proxy for capacity limit) and number of employees (as a measure of plant size). As Table 3 illustrates, only plants in the manufacturing industries are included in the estimation sample.
The plants in the control group remained either unregulated (with regard to greenhouse gas emissions) or were regulated by a carbon tax, which we control for through the relative energy price variable. As plants above the capacity limit typically emit more than those below the limit, plants in the control group have lower average emissions than plants in the treatment group (see Table 2 in Section 3.3). However, as we are not interested in estimating absolute changes in emissions levels, but relative changes in emissions and emissions 13 The matching procedure used is the STATA routine psmatch2 with 1-10 nearest neighbor matching. We perform a robustness test using 1-3 neighbors (see Section 4.3).
14 The participation requirements are found in Law on Greenhouse Gas Emissions ("Klimakvoteforskriften"). 16 To require an exact match means that the matching procedure is only allowed to pick control plants with exactly the same matching variable value (in this case, a plant that emits the exact same type of pollutant).
17 We perform a robustness test using the 3-digit level (see Section 4.3).
intensities, the comparability issue is less severe.
We calculate dierence-in-dierences, and as an alternative estimate a xed eects model, on the matched sample to investigate the relation between each ETS phase and respectively emissions, emissions intensity, value added, and productivity, controlling for a number of other important variables. The sample average treatment eect is estimated using dummy variables for each phase, which indicates whether the plant participated in the ETS during this phase or not. We henceforth use the subscript i to denote the plant, t to denote year, and p to denote the phase.
Basic DID
For all four dependent variables (emissions, emissions intensity, value added and productivity), in general denoted Y , we estimate a basic DID. We dene 
In equation (1) α 0 is the constant term. The next terms are time dummies for each phase. 19
The parameters π p thus pick up common trends during the phases not attributed to the ETS. The parameters of main interest, β p , capture the treatment eects from being regulated by the ETS in phase p (i.e., whether the plant is regulated in year t interacted with the time dummies). The interaction term, E it × I (τ (p) ≤ t < τ (p + 1)), is thus equal to 1 if plant i is regulated by the ETS in year t and phase p includes year t. Note that plants entering in phase p are assumed to be aected by treatment also in subsequent phases as they remain regulated in the later phases. Moreover, we assume that the eect of phase p regulation is the same for all plants regardless of when they entered the ETS. Our specication takes into account that the quota prices, and also the quota allocation rules, dier between the phases.
Hence, also the treatment eects may dier phases. With respect to emissions and emissions intensities, we expect a negative estimate of β p , to the degree that the plants are incentivized to reduce emissions because of the regulation. For value added and productivity, the eects could go in either direction, and thus we do not have any prior expectation regarding the sign of the estimate of β p .
The vector X it contains the control variables described in Section 3.2, including dummies for industries (see Table 3 for a list). The error term, it , is assumed to be independent of the covariates in X it , the time dummies, the phase group xed eect, and the treatment variable. Number of employees is lagged by one year (t − 1) to avoid the potential problem of reversed causality and to reduce potential problems of simultaneity. The empirical results related to this specication are displayed in columns (1)- (2) in Tables 4 and 5 , where we investigate the eects of participation in the ETS on emissions and emissions intensity, as well as in columns (1)- (2) in Table 6 , where the eects on value added and productivity are shown. Before discussing the results in Section 4.3, we present an alternative specication.
Panel data regressions with plant specic eects
It is possible that plant specic eects are not fully taken care of by the phase group xed eects, which capture the mean dierence between the treatment groups (plants entering in phase I, II and III) and the control group not attributed to the regulation (cf. the specication in equation (1)). The validity of equation (1) rests most critically on the assumption that the treatment variables are independent of the unobserved plant specic xed eects.
An endogeneity problem occurs if unobserved variables that aect the dependent variables, also aect the treatment variables. One solution could be to use instrumental variables,
i.e., variables that contribute to exogenous variation in the selection into treatment, but do not have an eect on the dependent variables per se. However, we are not aware of any variables that qualify as instruments. Instead, the solution we favor is to allow correlation between unobserved plant specic xed eects, ν i , and the treatment variables. Rather than simply including group xed eects to capture the xed dierence between the treatment group and the control group (γ p from (1)) we therefore include a plant xed eect (ν i ) in this specication:
The results are displayed in column (3) in Tables 4 and 5 (for emissions and emissions intensity), and in columns (2) and (4) in Table 6 (for value added and productivity). We acknowledge that the basic specication in equation (1) does not solve the simultaneity issues.
Most importantly, plants that are regulated by the ETS are likely to be more emissions intensive than plants not regulated by the ETS. Including phase-group xed eects instead of plant xed eects will thus lead to positive correlation between the error term and the treatment variables. Hence, the specication in equation (2) is more appropriate for causal interpretations. However, the specication in equation (1) is much more parsimonious, which in particular can matter for such a small data set as we employ here. Moreover, the specication in (1) allows us to control for plant size, relative energy prices, industry specic eects, phase group specic eects and phase time specic eects. We thus argue that the version of the basic dierence-in-dierences specication in equation (1), where we include control variables (i.e. column (2) in Tables 4-5 and columns (1)- (2) in Tables 6-7) , also provides results that can reasonably be interpreted as treatment eects of the ETS.
Results

Emissions and emissions intensity
The estimated eects of the ETS on emissions are presented in Table 4 .
Columns (1)- (2) display the results of the basic dierence-in-dierences specication (1), without and with control variables, respectively, whereas column (3) displays the results of specication (2), i.e., including plant xed eects. The specication of equation (1) From the results in Table 4 , according to all specications in columns (1)- (3), it appears that phase I had no signicant eect on emissions. The same applies to phase III, although the estimated eects are consistently negative in all three specications. In phase II, on the other hand, we the estimated eects on emissions is negative. In the basic dierence-in-dierences model in column (1), the estimate (-0.59) is signicant at the 5 percent level.
This could indicate large decreases in emissions from participation in phase II of the ETS, i.e., around 45 percent (e −0.59 −1 = −0.45). This is in line with what we observed in Figure 2 above. However, when we add control variables, the estimated emissions reduction is lowered to -0.36 and signicant at the 10 percent level (see column (2)). The estimate drops further to -0.33 (signicant at the 10 percent level) when plant xed eects are taken into account, cf. column (3). Overall, we see some tendencies of emissions reductions due to the ETS in phase II.
Next, we test the one-sided hypothesis that there has been no emissions reduction due to the ETS in any of the three phases, i.e., we test the one-sided null hypothesis that min (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) ≥ 0, against the alternative that at least one of the coecients is negative,
i.e., min (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) < 0. We perform a one-sided test as the expectation from economic theory is that the ETS should cause a negative change in emissions. Based on the test results we can only weakly reject the null hypothesis (at the 10 percent level) and only in the most basic model (column (1)). The p-values range from 10 to 25 percent across the specications. The test results indicate that the estimated negative eect of phase II could be random. However, if any emissions reduction can be ascribed to the ETS, it likely took place in phase II rather than in phase I or III. Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that β 1 = β 2 = β 3 , although in the most basic model in column (1) the p-value is not far from the 10 percent rejection level (14 percent). Moreover, the hypothesis that β 1 = β 2 = β 3 is rejected in the robustness test reported in Table 7 (column (3)) in Section 4.3.3 where we only include emissions of CO 2 . This indicates that the specication where we allow the eects of the ETS to dier between phases is the most appropriate one.
A possible explanation for the lack of emissions reductions of phase I could be that in this phase, Norway had an ETS that was not formally linked with the EU ETS. As explained in Section 2, Norwegian plants could buy but not sell quotas to plants in EU countries.
The extent of buying quotas from EU plants was tiny, which is understandable as the total allocation to Norwegian plants exceeded total emissions by 8 percent during phase I. Hence, it is tempting to conclude that there was no binding cap on emissions from Norwegian plants in the rst phase. The lack of eect for phase I could also be related to the fact that this was a pilot phase, and that the plants needed time to adjust to a new regulation. It is also possible that plants expected allocation in future phases to be based on their emissions levels during phase I, in which case there could actually be some incentives to inate emissions.
Moreover, it may take time to adjust to a new regulatory regime. Decisions about activity level and investments in new equipment typically take time, and there may be also be some 20 In phase III, the allocation rules were changed more signicantly, but most of the manufacturing industries still receive close to 100 percent of the allowances they need for free (cf. Section 2). 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Treatment plants are matched to control plants based on predetermined values of CO 2 , N 2 O and P F C emissions, number of employees, and exact matching on industries at the 2-digit level.
Column (1) is a basic DID specication. Column (2) is a basic DID with additional control variables. Column (3) is a panel data regression with plant xed eects and additional control variables.
Tests of hypotheses:
One-sided test of no eect in any phase: p-value p-value p-value
Wald test of equality of coecients:
.14 .41 .43
Regarding the control variables, we rst observe that emissions reductions seem to have taken place in all three phases, independently of the ETS. All estimated coecients for the time dummies (π p ) are negative, although whether these are signicant dier somewhat between phases and specications. In columns (1)- (2), where xed eects are at the group level rather than at the plant level, we see that plants entering in phase III have higher average emissions levels than plants entering in phase I and II. Furthermore, the estimated eect of relative energy prices is -0.21 in column (2), signicant at the 5 percent level. A 10 percent increase in relative energy prices would according to this result lead to a 2.1 percent reduction in emissions. However, in column (3) the estimate is only -0.07 and not signicant at conventional levels. The estimated eect of plant size (log of number of employees) varies from 0.83-0.97 and is signicant at the 1 percent level in both column (2) and (3). A 10 percent increase in number of employees thus leads to an increase in emissions by 8.3-9.7 percent, indicating that emissions are close to proportional to plant size. Both these results are as expected.
Next, we investigate the eects on emissions intensity. From the results displayed in Table   5 , there appears to be no signicant eects of any of the three phases on emissions intensity.
The estimated eects of phase I have both positive and negative signs depending on the specication. The estimates of β 2 and β 3 are negative in all specications, but the estimates are not signicant at conventional levels. This may suggest that, to the extent that the ETS participation led to emissions reductions in phase II, this occurred through reduced activity level (and thus emissions) rather than through reduced emissions intensity. This could for instance be the case for some plants if it is costly to reduce emissions per output, and at the same time dicult to pass on the higher costs to the consumers (e.g., because they operate in a global competitive market). Hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that none of the phases have caused any emissions intensity reduction. This is also the conclusion when we test the null hypothesis that there has been no emissions intensity reduction in any of the three phases against the alternative that at least one of the phases had such an eect (i.e., the hypothesis that min (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) ≥ 0 vs. min (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) < 0).
When it comes to the control variables, we see from Table 5 (2). This is similar to the case of emissions (Table 4 ). In column (3), however, the estimate is lower and no longer signicant. Finally, whereas larger plants (not surprisingly) were estimated to have higher average emissions (cf . Table 4) , we do not nd signicant eects of number of employees on plants' emissions intensity (this is consistent with the close to proportional eect on emissions level in Table 4 ). emissions, number of employees, and exact matching on industries at the 2-digit level.
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4.3.2
Value added and productivity
We also investigate the eects of the ETS on real value added and (labor) productivity among Norwegian plants. The results are displayed in Table 6 . Columns (1)- (2) display the results of the basic dierence-in-dierences specication (equation (1)), whereas the results in columns (3)- (4) display the results of the plant xed eect specication (equation (2)).
The estimates of β p now reect the expected relative change in value added and productivity due to participation in a given phase.
For phase II, the estimated eects on both value added and productivity are positive and signicant. In both specications, the estimated eect of phase II on value added is 0.25 (signicant at the 5 percent level), which implies an estimated 28 percent increase in value added. The estimated eect of phase II on productivity is 0.25-0.26 (signicant at the 1 percent level in column (2) and at the 5 percent level in column (4)). For phase I and III, the estimated eects on value added and productivity are positive but not signicant (across all specications). However, we do reject the hypothesis that there is no eect on value added and productivity in any of the three phases, in the two-sided 21 null hypothesis that min (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) = 0, against the alternative that min (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) = 0. The p-values are within the 5 percent level across all specications.
The positive eects on value addded and productivity of phase II may seem a bit strange as the environmental regulation puts constraints on the plants. However, as discussed in the introduction, there are several possible reasons why the ETS might increase value added and productivity. First, the manufacturing plants receive large amounts of free allowances. If they are able to reduce their emissions at relatively low costs, they can sell excess allowances and earn a prot that possibly exceeds their abatement costs. Moreover, if the marginal costs are (partly) passed on to consumers, their revenue could increase. The fact that we only nd signicant positive eects in phase II can be due to the relatively higher average quota price in 21 As economic theory is ambivalent with regards to whether environmental regulations cause positive or negative changes in value added and productivity, we now use a two-sided rather than a one-sided test.
this phase compared to phase III, and the fact that Norway had an ETS that was not formally linked with the EU ETS in phase I. As mentioned in the introduction, Bushnell et al. (2013) show that stock prices for European carbon-intensive manufacturing industries declined when allowance prices were halved in April 2006, suggesting a positive relationship between quota prices and economic performance for the regulated plants. Second, the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) points to the fact that environmental regulations give more incentives to innovate, which may spur productivity and competitiveness. However, as this process is likely to take some time, the former explanation may be more plausible.
For all specications we can reject, within the 5 percent level of signicance, the hypothesis that β 1 = β 2 = β 3 , conrming that the estimated eects dier across phases. Our specication which allows the eects to dier across phases is thus the most appropriate one.
Regarding the control variables, we see that there are signicant increases in value added and productivity during all three phases independently of the ETS (see the estimates of π p ).
Moreover, the results suggest that plants entering in phase I and phase III are characterized by higher value added and higher productivity than plants entering in phase II and plants never regulated by the ETS (again independently of the ETS). We identify positive and signicant eects of relative energy prices on value added and productivity in columns (1)-(2). The estimates are 0.06 in both columns, signicant at the 5 percent level, implying that a 10 percent increase in relative energy prices is estimated to increase value added and productivity by 0.6 percent. It is dicult to say whether this result is simply due to lower prices of electricity (recall that the relative energy price is calculated as the price of fossil energy over the price of electricity), or if it is related to the Porter hypothesis. In the model with plant xed eects in columns (3)- (4), the estimates are positive but no longer signicant. Finally, a 10 percent increase in the number of employees is estimated to increase value added by 7.1-9.8 percent (signicant at the 1 percent level in both models). Columns
(2)-(3) indicates no dierence in productivity based on the size of the plant. Hence, we do not observe any scale eects. The results are displayed in Table 7 . In columns (1)- (2) we report the results of the basic dierence-in-dierences model with control variables, whereas in columns (3)-(4) plant xed eects are included. First, we identify no signicant eects of either phase I or phase III in any of the specications. This is similar to the results when all three greenhouse gases are included. Second, the estimated eects of phase II are negative across all specications, but not signicant at conventional levels (the lowest p-value of 0.11 is obtained in columns (3)-(4) where we estimate the eects on emissions and emissions intensity including plant xed eects). The estimated eect on emissions (-0.26) is quite similar to the corresponding estimate in Table 4 (-0.33), i.e., when also N 2 O and P F Cs are included. In any case, we cannot reject in any specication the hypothesis that there is no eect of any of the three ETS phases on emissions and emissions intensity. However, in columns (3)- (4) we can reject that the eects of the phases do not dier, which validates our specication allowing the eects to dier across phases.
Regarding the control variables, we identify general CO 2 emissions and emissions intensity reductions in phase I and II that are not due to the ETS (however, the signicance levels depend on the specication). Moreover, we still see a tendency that plants that entered the ETS in phase III had slightly higher emissions and emissions intensities than plants that entered in earlier phases, and that plants regulated by the ETS have higher emissions and emissions intensities than plants never regulated by the ETS. We identify negative and signicant (at the 1 percent level) eects of relative energy prices on CO 2 emissions and emissions intensity in columns (1)-(2).
The estimates are about -0.3 for both variables, implying that a 10 percent increase in relative energy prices is estimated to decrease CO 2 emissions and emissions intensity by 3 percent. In the model with plant xed eects in columns (3)-(4), the estimated eect on emissions intensity drop (in absolute value) to -0.03, signicant at the 10 percent level, whereas the estimated eect on emissions (0.02) is not signicant. Finally, a 10 percent increase in the number of employees is estimated to increase CO 2 emissions by 6.2-8.9 percent (signicant at the 1 percent level in both specications).
The eect of an increase in the number of employees on CO 2 emissions intensity is negative and signicant in the basic specication, suggesting scale eects. However, this eect is no longer there in the specication that includes plant specic eects.
We also perform a number of robustness tests for which we do not provide tables. We replicate the results of Tables 5 and 7 Tables 5 and 7 . Next, we replicate Tables 4-7 on a sample with 1:3 nearest neighbor matching rather than 1:10. Again, the estimated coecients and the corresponding p-values are very similar to those reported in Tables 4-7 .
Finally, we replicate Tables 4-7 on a sample of treated and non-treated plants that are matched at the 3-digit industry level (rather than at the 2-digit level as in our main model).
The estimated eects of phase II on emissions and emissions intensities (Tables 4-5 and 7) are no longer signicant at conventional levels. This is possibly related to the drop in number of plant-year observations from 1,567 to 1,134. However, the estimated eects of phase II on economic performance still hold. We identify signicant positive eects on value added and productivity in phase II across all specications. The eects of phase II on value added lie in the range 31-32 percent, whereas the eect on productivity lie in the range 28-30 percent. we match at a more detailed industry level. Thus, the emission reduction found in phase II should be interpreted with caution. Moreover, when we estimate the eects on emissions intensities, we nd no signicant eects in any of the phases.
The limited eects on emissions and emissions intensity in our estimations can possibly be explained by the fact that the manufacturing industries have received close to a 100 percent of the quotas they need to cover their business-as-usual emissions. Surplus quotas could in principle have been sold to other plants, but the substantial allocation of quotas in the EU ETS (and other factors such as the nancial crisis) have led to low quota prices. Thus the incentives for emissions reductions have been small throughout most of the period of EU ETS. When it comes to phase I, Norway was not formally linked to the EU ETS, and it may be questioned whether there was any binding cap on emissions for most Norwegian plants in this phase. Finally, the quota price was on average higher in the second phase than in the beginning of the third phase, which may explain why we nd signicant emissions reductions of phase II but not of phase III.
Our results further suggest that the ETS led to signicantly higher value added and productivity in phase II. These ndings are related to the fact that plants on average receive close to 100 percent of the allowances they need for free. If all allowances were instead auctioned by the government, the plants' costs would have been higher and thus value added and productivity lower. Furthermore, the plants may have been able to pass on (parts of ) the increased marginal costs to the consumers, and hence increase their revenues through higher output prices. Finally, we notice that increased productivity due to environmental regulation is also consistent with the Porter Hypothesis.
We nd no signicant changes in the two other phases on neither productivity nor value added, although the estimates are consistently positive. The explanation for nding positive and signicant impacts on economic performance only in phase II could be that the quota price facing Norwegian plants was highest in this phase. Hence, the mechanisms described in the previous paragraph were likely strongest in the second phase. The extent of allocation to manufacturing plants have not changed substantially between the phases.
In our study we control for phase time specic eects. However, it is possible that treated plants were dierently aected by e.g. the nancial crisis if they were more or less trade exposed than the control group. To our knowledge, empirical studies on the eects of the ETS on plants' or rms' emissions so far rely on matching methods in combination with dierence-in-dierences strategies. However, dierences between regulated and unregulated plants might not be fully accounted for. As the regulator selects plants for participation in the ETS based on the capacity limit (e.g., total thermal eect or tons of products), regression discontinuity constitutes a suitable method for estimating the eects of the ETS. For further analysis on larger data sets, regression discontinuity methods should be considered.
From a policy perspective, our results do not give clear conclusions with regard to whether emissions trading lead to lower emissions. As emissions trading is a quantity instrument, it should in theory lead to emissions reductions if the cap is set below the unregulated emissions level. However, in our study we have only looked at Norwegian plants, and not all European plants regulated by the EU ETS. Moreover, since plants are allowed to bank allowances to the next phase, and also buy osets from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), it is far from obvious how much overall emissions are reduced within a given phase.
Our results also suggest that Norwegian plants on average would not be negatively af-fected by the ETS even if more of the allowances were auctioned instead of given away for free to the plants. Free allocation of allowances is mainly motivated by the risk of carbon leakage. However, show that the current allocation in the EU ETS results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. As allocation rules are determined at the EU level (also for the non-EU member Norway), the Norwegian authorities are not in a position to adjust the allocation. Nevertheless, our results should be relevant when considering the extent of allocation, both at the EU level and more generally.
